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Has the creation of the euro changed the way the real e⁄ective exchange rates of the countries sharing
the single currency adjust to global economic shocks? Such a question is as relevant as ever since
the breakout of the global crisis of 2007/9. It is framed in a longer-standing debate, however, on the
economic costs and bene￿ts of European and Monetary Union (EMU), which was particularly intense
in the run-up to EMU and has never really faded away. The global crisis has indeed given a completely
new dimension to the questions as to how euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates adjust in
the face of global economic shocks, and as to whether the introduction of the euro has changed this
adjustment pattern.
Two main views stand out. On the one hand, there is a perception in Europe that the single
currency is a shield against global turbulences. Noticeably, euro adoption remains undeniably attractive,
as Slovakia￿ s and Estonia￿ s entry as the 16th and 17th member of the euro area in 2009 and 2011 seem
to suggest. On the other hand, the crisis has exposed the unsustainability of increasing divergences
in the external competitiveness of euro area countries during the ￿rst decade of EMU (see Figure 1),
which is at the core of today￿ s debate on the future of the euro area.1
The literature so far has not considered the way global shocks a⁄ect the competitiveness of individual
euro area countries. The literature on the impact of EMU has focused largely on studying overall
convergence in business cycles and prices within the euro area (e.g. Enders, Jung, and M￿ller (2009),
Canova et al. (2006), Engel and Rogers (2002), and Rogers (2007)2), with such studies often ￿nding
strong evidence of growing business cycles synchronization and price convergence in the run up to the
introduction of the euro in 1999, albeit less so afterwards. There are also studies on the impact of
EMU on European integration, focusing both on trade (e.g. Baldwin (2006)) and ￿nancial integration
(e.g. Cappiello et al. (2009); Coeurdacier and Martin (2009); DeSantis and Gerard (2009); Lane
(2006)). Other recent papers have examined the divergences in current account balances within the
euro area since the creation of the euro, their determinants and/or implications in the context of
growing discussions on intra-euro area imbalances (see e.g. Berger and Nitsch (2010); Jaumotte and
Sodsriwiboon (2010); Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010)).
The goal of this paper is to help answer a question for which hard evidence seems to be largely
missing, namely ￿how have global shocks impacted the real e⁄ective exchange rates of individual euro
1In particular, the 16 euro area Finance Ministers noted in early-2010 that ￿competitiveness divergences and current-
account imbalances increased steadily in pre-crisis years and have in most cases largely persisted throughout the crisis
[...] Given vulnerabilities and the magnitude of the adjustment required, the need for policy action is particularly
pressing in Member States showing persistently large current-account de￿cits and large competitiveness losses￿(Eurogroup
conclusions on the surveillance of intra-euro area competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances, Brussels, 15 March
2010).
2European Commission (2008) and European Central Bank (2008) provide thorough surveys.
1area countries since the euro￿ s creation?￿ . Our focus on global shocks is motivated by the heated
debates that preceded the launch of the euro. At that time, the impact of asymmetric shocks and
the asymmetric e⁄ects of common shocks were heavily discussed. It was feared that if euro area
countries were to be hit by global shocks with asymmetric e⁄ects, diverging patterns of macroeconomic
performances could have adverse implications in a monetary union in which some of the conditions of
an optimum currency area (e.g. free labour mobility, price and wage ￿ exibility, and the existence of
￿scal transfers) were not met. A decade after the creation of the euro, it is time to assess whether
these concerns were justi￿ed. We also focus explicitly on real e⁄ective exchange rates as a measure
of external competitiveness, because it is an aspect that is crucial in the current debate on the euro
area￿ s future, notably since the launch by EU Heads of States and Governments in March 2011 of a
￿ Euro Plus Pact￿(also formely known as a ￿ Pact for Competitiveness￿ ) that aims to address losses of
competitiveness among Member States of the area.
The exercise we carry out is non-trivial for three main reasons.
First, even if one can expect the adjustment to global shocks of euro area countries￿real e⁄ective
exchange rates to have converged to some extent after EMU, the much deeper question is: converged
to what? There, the spectrum of possible answers is wide open. The adjustment could be now akin to
the simple average of euro area countries￿patterns of adjustment before the euro; or more like that of
the most credible economy before the euro; or like that of a less credible economy. This question could
not be answered previously due to limitations in existing econometric models.
Second, roughly half of euro area countries￿trade remains with countries outside the euro area
and domestic price evolutions have not been identical across the euro area since the start of EMU.3
In addition, institutional di⁄erences across countries, as well as di⁄erences related to the industrial or
￿nancial structure of the individual EMU countries could be additional sources of heterogeneity (these
di⁄erences and their impact on the monetary transmission mechanism are tackled for instance in Mihov
(2001)). This suggests that the impact of global shocks on their real e⁄ective exchange rates is not
necessarily homogenous, ex ante. In fact, much of the recent debate on the cohesion of the euro area
was indeed related to the di⁄erences in individual countries￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rates. By focusing
on global shocks speci￿cally, we are therefore able to shed some light on a possible source of divergence
in the evolution of euro area countries￿competitiveness performance and to assess whether it has come
from di⁄erent responses (or patterns of adjustment) to such particular types of shocks.
Third, from a methodological point of view, estimating vector-autogressive (VAR) models is a
natural way to approach our question since exchange rates are highly endogenous and those models
are typically used to estimate the impact of shocks. However, a crucial and well-known problem is the
dimensionality of the system, encountered even with VAR models including a few variables for a short
3As to the former aspect, it is important to note that there is heterogeneity among euro area countries in terms of
exposure to both overall non-euro area trade and to the various countries and regions outside the euro area.
2time horizon. Even if meanwhile the euro area has slightly more than 12 years of existence, we have to
model here the real e⁄ective exchange rates of 17 euro area countries along with the exchange rates of
the rest of the world￿ s economies as a control group. In total, we have over 60 currencies and twenty
years of monthly data (the 10 years before the creation of the euro in 1999 and the ten years after).
Estimating such a VAR model would be simply impossible with standard techniques, due to a problem
traditionally coined in the literature as "the curse of dimensionality".4
We overcome this problem by resorting to a recent methodology introduced by Chudik and Pesaran
(2011b) and later extended by Chudik and Pesaran (2011a) in the context of the analysis of VARs of
growing dimensions (so-called in￿nite-dimensional VARs, or IVARs for short), a methodology that also
establishes conditions under which the increasingly used ￿Global VAR model￿developed by Pesaran
et al. (2004) is applicable. Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) propose a set of restrictions on the coe¢ cients
of the unrestricted VAR that are binding only in the limit (i.e. as the number of variables N ! 1) to
shrink the parameter space and deal with the dimensionality problem. These restrictions draw from
an economically intuitive notion, that of ￿neighbourhood e⁄ects￿ . The latter is based on the idea
that some of the units included in a large VAR model (i.e. in our case some of the over 60 countries￿
real e⁄ective exchange rates) are more important than others and have non-negligible spatio-temporal
e⁄ects on the other units (referred to as their ￿neighbours￿ ). On the other hand, the remaining
units (referred to as ￿non-neighbours￿ ) are presumably less important and assumed to have negligible
individual spatio-temporal e⁄ects.5
We allow for a very rich set-up for our pre and post-EMU IVARs of real e⁄ective exchange rates,
where shocks can be transmitted across space and time through various channels. The United States
(US) is treated as a dominant unit, given the US dollar￿ s overarching role in global foreign exchange
markets. Alongside the US, we allow for the possibility of another source of strong cross-section
dependence, whose origin is yet unidenti￿ed, and control for its potential impact with cross-section
averages of the variables. This aside, each country is allowed to have a speci￿c set of neighbours, which
are de￿ned on the basis of bilateral trade and ￿nancial linkages. We make no homogeneity assumptions,
i.e. all units in our systems are treated as heterogenous. Last, the estimated systems pass a range of
speci￿cation tests and robustness checks successfully.
We propose several statistics based on Euclidean distance measures between impulse response func-
tions (pre- and post-EMU) to formally compare the transmission of shocks across space and time in
the estimated IVARs. Clearly, one could think of a large variety of shocks to consider in our context,
but it would be unrealistic to envisage to model all of them. To compare the spatio-temporal dynamic
4For instance, for a VAR model with three lags, we have in our case 62 (number of variables) ￿ 62 ￿ 3 = 11532
parameters to estimate and only 12 (months) ￿ 10 (years) ￿ 62 = 7440 observations.
5Arguably, the aggregated impact of non-neighbours could still be large, depending on the degree of cross-section
dependence among the units. Such an aggregated impact is in general important when the cross-section dependence is
strong (in the sense de￿ned by Chudik, Pesaran, and Tosetti (2011)), in which case it is possible to control for it by
using cross-section averages, an idea originally introduced by Pesaran (2006) in the context of the estimation of large
heterogenous panels with a multi-factor error structure.
3properties of the two IVAR systems, we therefore focus here on three types of shocks: a global US
dollar shock, (non-identi￿ed) shocks arising from generalised impulse response functions and a global
shock to risk aversion.6 A key asset of our approach is that we only need to impose that it is the very
same type of shock that hit the two systems, which ensures that we can draw meaningful comparisons
between the pre- and post-EMU periods, and thereby assess whether or not the creation of the euro
was a major turning point.
The ￿rst key result of the paper is that the change in the response pattern of euro area countries￿
real e⁄ective exchange rate after EMU depends crucially on the nature of global shocks. In the face of
US dollar shocks, the response of euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates has become more
similar to that of Germany prior to EMU. In other words, the pattern of adjustment of euro area
countries￿external competitiveness in the face of US dollar shocks is now akin to that of the economy
that issued the anchor legacy currency in Europe prior to EMU. When considering generalized impulse
response function shocks, we obtain broadly similar results. But when considering global shocks to risk
aversion, the response of euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates has become more distant
from that of Germany prior to EMU and closer to that of countries such as Italy, Portugal or Spain
prior to EMU, i.e. of economies of the euro area￿ s periphery.
Importantly, in the case of both types of global shocks, euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange
rates depreciate when the US dollar appreciates after EMU. In our interpretation, this might re￿ ect the
fact that the euro has become the globally most relevant alternative to the US dollar as an international
currency, with a liquidity unmatched by any of the legacy currencies, and hence the main counterpart
to US dollar movements. One of the most noteworthy changes is Germany￿ s response pattern to global
risk aversion shocks, from appreciation before EMU ￿ when the Deutsche Mark had a safe haven status￿
to depreciation after EMU￿along with all other euro area countries.
Another key result of the paper is that the response of the real e⁄ective exchange rates of countries
sharing the single currency in the face of global economic shocks has become more homogeneous since
the creation of the euro, and to an extent that is unmatched in the rest of the world. This result
is noteworthy given the diverging pattern of individual euro area countries￿external competitiveness
which has been increasingly discussed since the outbreak of the global crisis of 2007/9. This, in turn,
suggests that the divergence in real e⁄ective exchange rates observed across the euro area in the ￿rst
decade of EMU is unlikely to be due to global external shocks with asymmetric e⁄ects, but rather to
other factors, such as EMU country-speci￿c domestic shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After introducing the methodology in Section 2,
Section 3 discusses how to compare the impact of shocks in the pre- and post-EMU IVARs. Data and
6Changes in risk aversion and appetite are regarded as important drivers of foreign exchange markets, not only when
it comes to emerging market economies but also, more recently, to advanced economies (e.g. McCauley and McGuire
(2009), Adrian, Etula, and Shin (2010)). For a recent discussion of risk aversion shocks, see also Popescu and Smets
(2010).
4key stylized facts are presented in Section 4, followed by the main estimation and speci￿cation test
results in Section 5. Section 6 compares the spatio-temporal transmission of shocks before and after
EMU, and the last section concludes. The appendix presents supplementary tables and ￿gures.
2 A high dimensional VAR model with a dominant unit of global
real e⁄ective exchange rates
Let xit denote the real e⁄ective exchange rate of country i in period t. We treat exchange rates as jointly
determined and we suppose that the vector of N real e⁄ective exchange rates, xt = (x1t;:::;xNt)
0, is
given by the following VAR model,
xt = ￿xt￿1 + ut, (1)
where ￿ is an N ￿ N matrix of coe¢ cients and ut is a N ￿ 1 vector of reduced form errors. We
abstract here in the notation from higher order lags or deterministic terms to keep exposition as simple
as possible.




￿ijxj;t￿1 + uit. (2)
In empirical applications, unrestricted VAR models typically include at most ￿ve to seven variables.
But in our particular case, we have 16 euro area countries plus the rest of the world as a control group,
i.e. a sample of over 60 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates. N is therefore over 60 and T is about
120 (a decade of monthly observations). For reliable inference and reasonable parameter estimation,
we need however far more observations, such as several decades, if not a hundred years of data. But
even in this case, the estimation of an unrestricted VAR would not be an appealing option due to the
increasing likelihood of structural breaks in such a longer span of data. A priori, the estimation of an
unrestricted high dimensional VAR is therefore impaired by the ￿curse of dimensionality￿problem.
2.1 Solution to the dimensionality problem
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to tackle this problem. We resort here to the
methodology developed by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b). This approach consists in putting a set of
restrictions (that are binding only in the limit, i.e. as N ! 1) on the coe¢ cients of the unrestricted
VAR to shrink the space of parameters. These restrictions draw from an economically intuitive notion,
that of ￿neighborhood e⁄ects￿ , which is based on the idea that some of the units included in a large
VAR model (i.e. some of the over 60 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates in our case) are more
important than others and have non-negligible spatio-temporal e⁄ects on other units (referred to as
5their ￿neighbours￿ ). Conversely, the remaining units (referred to as ￿non-neighbours￿ ) are assumed to
be less important and to have negligible individual spatio-temporal e⁄ects, i.e. e⁄ects which die away
at a suitable rate proportional to N. The shrinkage of the parameter space (as N ! 1) comes from the
fact that it is then su¢ cient to control for the aggregate spatio-temporal impact of the non-neighbours,
an impact which can be simply proxied by cross-section averages of the variables.
In an unrestricted VAR all units would be neighbours, but such a model is too complex to be esti-
mated reliably, which re￿ ects a usual trade-o⁄between model richness and the precision of estimation.7
The approach retained here tries to strike a fair balance between these two aspects. More formally,
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￿ < K for j 2 Ni. As shown by Chudik and Pesaran (2011b), these restrictions turn out






! 0 if fxitg is cross-sectionally weakly dependent. In this case, the aggregate
spatio-temporal impact of the non-neighbours is negligible and it is possible to estimate the neighbour
coe¢ cients by simply ignoring the non-neighbours. If fxitg is strongly cross-sectionally dependent, then
the aggregate spatio-temporal impact of the non-neighbours is generally signi￿cant and important for
consistent estimation and can be approximated by cross-section averages, in particular.
Moreover, as opposed to a strict separation between neighbours and non-neighbours in (3), one
could also allow for a linear combination of the units (i.e. a spatially weighted average) to enter the
set of neighbours. This is an approach which we will also pursue below.
2.2 The IVAR model of real e⁄ective exchange rates
We make the following assumptions about neighbours, non-neighbours and patterns of cross-section
dependence. The US is treated as globally dominant, i.e. the in￿ uence of its currency, the US dollar, is
7On the one hand, specifying a relatively parsimonious model often yields strong estimation results, but at the expense
of omission bias of key variables if the model is too simple. On the other hand, a more complex model allows for a richer
representation of the interactions between variables, but at the expense of estimation precision, due to the loss in degrees
of freedom.
6unrestricted. Put it di⁄erently, the coe¢ cients corresponding to the US dollar are left unrestricted and,
as such, shocks to the US currency can have non-negligible spatio-temporal e⁄ects on the real e⁄ective
exchange rate of any other country. This is a reasonable assumption to make given the prominence
of the US dollar in the current international monetary system, its overarching role in global foreign
exchange markets (see, for instance, Goldberg (2010)), which also rests on the signi￿cant importance
of the US in the global economy.
The US aside, we allow for an additional source of strong cross-section dependence in the system,
which could come, for example, from an unobserved common factor. This source is captured by
country-speci￿c cross-section averages of foreign variables, denoted as xit = (N ￿ 1)
￿1 P
j6=i xjt.
We identify the neighbours of a given country i on the basis of the intensity of bilateral trade and
￿nancial linkages. We select as neighbouring units those countries that have "strong" such linkages
with country i. In practice, whenever the share of country j in country i ￿ s total foreign trade or
foreign ￿nancial exposures exceeds ad-hoc thresholds of 20% and 30%, respectively, it is considered as
a neighbour whose impact on country i is fully estimated. We consider three sets of weights: bilateral
trade in goods (constructed from the IMF￿ s DOTS database), bilateral foreign equity exposures and
bilateral foreign debt exposures (constructed from the IMF￿ s CPIS database). We denote the set






ij, for a 2 fTr;Eq;Dg, is the
weight of country j in country i￿ s total foreign trade or foreign exposure to equities or debt securities,
respectively, and ￿a is the corresponding threshold (￿Tr = 20%, and ￿Eq = ￿D = 30%). In addition
to these selected neighbouring units, we consider three spatially weighted averages which exclude the
latter. These spatial averages are denoted as xa
wit; for a 2 fTr;Eq;Dg (i.e. indices for the trade, equity
and debt weights, respectively) and they are treated similarly as the selected individual neighboring
units, i.e. their direct spatio-temporal impact on unit i is estimated fully.8

























for i = 2;3;:::;N, where the real e⁄ective exchange rate of country i in period t is regressed on
a constant, contemporaneous and lagged values of the US dollar￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate (the
dominant unit, denoted as country 1), its own lags, contemporaneous and lagged values of cross-
section averages (a proxy for an unobserved common factor, if present), lagged values of the individual
neighbouring units and spatial averages as de￿ned above. This cross-section-augmented regression is
estimated by least squares (LS).











7For the US, the following marginal model is estimated:



















w1t + e1t, (6)
where it is to be noted that the contemporaneous values of cross-section averages x1t do not enter the
marginal model for the dominant unit, as explained in Chudik and Pesaran (2011b).
The number of lags fpikg
3
k=1, fqijgj2Ni, and fra
i ga2fTr;Eq;Dg are selected using the Schwarz-Bayesian
criterion, with the maximum lag being set equal to 3 in all cases. The resulting model space is thus quite
large. For instance, the number of conditional models for a single country with only one neighboring
unit is 37 = 2187. Once estimated on a country-by-country basis, individual models (5)-(6) are stacked
and solved together in a large reduced-form VAR model (as originally suggested in the GVAR literature;
see Pesaran et al. (2004)). The solved high-dimensional VAR model with a dominant unit can then be
used for impulse response analysis in a standard fashion.
It is worth noting that our set of over 60 real e⁄ective exchange rates does not constitute a closed
system, i.e. we do not have all the currencies that are part of all the baskets used to construct all of the
real e⁄ective exchange rates.9 There is therefore no accounting constraint which can be imposed to our
system, which also implies that we can derive impulse response functions only for e⁄ective exchange
rates, and not for bilateral rates.
3 Comparison of pre- and post-EMU IVARs
How do global shocks transmit across space and time in the two high dimensional VAR systems es-
timated prior and post-EMU? To address these questions, we compare the behaviour of real e⁄ective
exchange rates in the two systems by means of impulse response analysis. For this purpose, it is worth
stressing that identifying "pure" economic shocks is not at all essential.10 The only issue that really
matters is that it is the same shock (even not identi￿ed) which is considered when comparing the two
VAR systems, prior and post-EMU. As an aside, it would clearly be a formidable challenge to identify
all shocks in our high-dimensional system (as this would require over 1,800 identifying restrictions!) let
alone to identify the country origin of these structural shocks in our multi-country set-up.
We study the spatio-temporal transmission of three types of shocks: a US dollar shock, (non-
identi￿ed) shocks arising from generalised impulse response functions and a shock to risk aversion.
9Our main data source for the real e⁄ective exchange rates in our sample is the IMF IFS database, which does not
disclose details on the composition of their currency baskets and which might also change over time.
10Identifying econommic shocks is arguably a traditional challenge in the literature due to e.g. the potential existence
of di⁄erent competing structural models underlying such shocks, or to the di¢ culty to identify their geographic origin.
As to the latter, it is reasonable indeed to assume that di⁄erent structural shocks, say productivity and monetary policy
shocks, are uncorrelated within a closed economy, but not when other economies are considered in the analysis. This
therefore makes it even more di¢ cult to identify such shocks in a large system. For a related discussion, see Dees, Pesaran,
Smith, and Smith (2010).
83.1 US dollar shocks
The ￿rst type of shock is a "US dollar" shock, i.e. a shock to the system￿ s dominant unit. Considering
this type of shock is a natural choice from an economic perspective, given that a possibly large US
dollar depreciation and a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances has often been - and still is -
regarded as a key risk to the global economy (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2005); Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2009);
International Monetary Fund (2005); Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009)) and the exceptional rise in
US dollar volatility that occurred during the 2007/9 global crisis.
In constructing impulse response functions, we follow Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2010) who
￿rst introduced spatio-temporal impulse response functions in a system with a dominant unit. Consider
conditional models (5) and a marginal model (6) for the US. Since conditional models are augmented
by contemporaneous and lagged values of x1t it follows that
cov (e1t;eit) = 0, for any i = 2;3;:::;N, (7)
once a suitable number of lags are included in the individual regressions. The US dollar shock is a
generalised impulse response function in the VAR given by (5)-(6) with the restriction (7) imposed in
the estimation on the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals et = (e1t;e2t;:::;eNt)
0.
By contrast with standard generalised impulse response functions in small-scale VARs, the shock
to the dominant unit is exactly identi￿ed in a large N context if the US dollar is the only source of
strong cross-section dependence in the system. Exact identi￿cation in this case is given by the statistical
assumption of US dollar dominance, and the underlying intuition is the same as for the identi￿cation of
an unobserved common factor in the approximate single factor model literature. However, if individual
units are still strongly cross-sectionally dependent once conditioned on the US dollar and its lags, the
US dollar shock is no longer identi￿ed.11
3.2 Generalised impulse response function shocks
The second type of shock we consider are generalised shocks to individual economies. Generalised
impulse response functions (GIRF) were proposed in Koop et al. (1996), and developed further in
Pesaran and Shin (1998) for VAR models. These shocks are clearly not structural in any sense, but
they remain useful to compare the dynamic properties of the two estimated IVARs. Generalised impulse
responses have the advantage of being independent from the ordering of the variables in the system,
which ensures that the results then obtained are not a⁄ected by di⁄erent orderings, which would be
otherwise the case with e.g. the standard Choleski decomposition.
11See Chudik and Pesaran (2011b) for further details on analysis of systems featuring a dominant unit.
93.3 Risk aversion shocks
The third and last type of shock we consider is a shock to risk aversion. Clearly, changes in risk aversion
and appetite are regarded as important drivers of foreign exchange markets, not only when it comes
to emerging market economies but also, more recently, to advanced economies (e.g. McCauley and
McGuire (2009), Adrian, Etula, and Shin (2010)).12 We remain somewhat agnostic when identifying
such risk aversion shocks and, to that end, impose "weak" sign restrictions on selected currencies.13
To the extent possible, we aim to motivate our sign restrictions by taking into account currencies￿
"typical" behaviour in times of heightened risk aversion. To that end, we consider selected major ￿ oat-
ing currencies and emerging (presumably riskier) market currencies during major historical episodes of
heightened risk aversion in the last 20 years (the so-called G10 group of the most liquid currencies in
the foreign exchange markets and two reasonably liquid emerging market currencies, the Korean won
and the Polish zloty). Figure A.1 plots the change in the (log of the) Chicago Board Options Exchange
Volatility Index (VIX) index together with the episodes corresponding to exceptionally large increases
in the latter (i.e. Iraq￿ s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990; Russia and LTCM￿ s crises in August 1998;
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 as well as Lehman brothers￿failure in September 2008).
Table A.1 reports the change in the real e⁄ective exchange rates of the currencies considered during
these episodes and the level of the VIX index. What is striking is that the US dollar, the Japanese yen
and the Swiss franc tended to appreciate during these major episodes of exceptionally high risk aversion
(although not during Iraq￿ s invasion of Kuwait for the US dollar and the yen), possibly pointing to
safe haven e⁄ects. On the other hand, the Korean won and the Polish zloty systematically depreciated,
possibly re￿ ecting the fact that they are often involved in risk-taking trading strategies which tend to
unwind in major episodes of market stress.
In line with this, risk shocks are identi￿ed by restricting the signs of the impulse response functions
to those where random shock draws lead contemporaneously to a (i) rise in the VIX index, (ii) appre-
ciation in the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc and (iii) depreciation in the Korean won and
Polish Zloty.
3.4 Comparison of pre- and post-EMU global shock transmission
In order to assess how the transmission of a given shock di⁄ers between the pre- and post-EMU periods,
we construct the following statistics based on the notion of euclidean distance between impulse response
functions.
The ￿rst statistics ￿￿
i measures how much the impact of a shock on a given country has changed
12In particular, the exceptional rise in volatility in the US dollar, euro and yen during the 2007/09 global crisis, has
been largely ascribed to an unprecedented rise in risk aversion which triggered a massive ￿ ight to the safety and liquidity
of US dollar-denominated assets and confounded previous scenarios of disorderly unwinding of global imbalances.
13Identi￿cation with sign restrictions is referred to as "weak" here in the sense that a variety of structural models could















Pre (i;h) denotes the impulse response function in the pre-EMU IVAR system to a one-standard
deviation shock of type ￿ (i.e. either a US dollar shock, a generalised impulse response function shock
or a shock to risk aversion) of country i￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate and at horizon h (with hm being
the maximum horizon considered and set equal to 4 hereafter), while g￿
Post (i;h) denotes the impulse
response function to the same type of shock in the post-EMU IVAR system.
The null hypothesis tested is that the impact of a shock of type ￿ is unchanged after the creation
of the euro, i.e. the euclidian distance is nil:
H0 : ￿￿
i = 0. (9)
We use bootstrap replications to compute critical values for ￿￿
i , where the replications used to compute
g￿
Post (i;h) are calculated on the basis of the data generating process from the estimated pre-EMU
IVAR system, and under the hypothesis of no break in coe¢ cients and variances.
The second statistics ￿￿
ij measures how di⁄erent the impact of a shock on a country after EMU is













For instance, taking Germany as the pre-EMU benchmark country, i.e. i = DE, the statistics helps
to measure whether the impact of a shock of type ￿ on a given country after EMU has become closer
to the impact it had on Germany before EMU (in other words, whether the pattern of adjustment of
country j￿ s external competitiveness in the face of global shocks has converged after EMU to Germany￿ s
pattern before EMU).
The null hypothesis tested is whether the impact of a shock of type ￿ on country j relative to that













Again, critical values for ￿a
ij are computed by bootstrap replications where the replications g￿
Post are
computed on the basis of the data generating process for the estimated pre-EMU IVAR system (and
under the assumption of no structural break).
These measures of euclidian distance can be calculated for impulse response functions to a US
11dollar shock and generalised shocks. However, due to the very nature of the identi￿cation scheme, they
cannot be calculated for impulse response functions to risk aversion shocks as a variety of structural
models could indeed satisfy the selected signs.14
4 Data and stylised facts
Our sample includes monthly data for the period between January 1989 and August 2009, i.e. approx-
imately the decade preceding the creation of the euro and the single currency￿ s ￿rst ten years.
For the data on real e⁄ective exchange rates, our main source is the IMF IFS database, the broadest
publicly available dataset on monthly (consumer price-based) real e⁄ective exchange rates. For missing
observations, we also use BIS (broad-58 country) real e⁄ective exchange rate indices and occasionally
construct our own indices for a few countries which were not covered in the IMF or BIS databases. All
in all, we have a broad set of 62 countries, including advanced, emerging and developing economies. A
detailed description of the data is given in Table A.2.
Figure 1 plots the real e⁄ective exchange rate of the euro area countries in log levels.15 Real
e⁄ective exchange rate evolutions have become more similar after EMU.16 But some di⁄erences in
external competitiveness evolutions did persist across euro area countries, which raises the question as
to where these di⁄erences come from. In relation to this, Table 1 reports the standard deviation of
the log-di⁄erences of the series pre- and post-EMU. Three striking observations stand out. The alleged
￿ core￿euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) had
far more stable real e⁄ective exchange rates than the other countries (the alleged ￿ periphery￿ ) before
EMU. All countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate have become more stable since the creation of the
euro (with the exception of Ireland), although not identically stable. Only Ireland has had a markedly
more volatile real e⁄ective exchange rate post-EMU than pre-EMU. Table 1 also reports cumulated
changes in real e⁄ective exchange rates over 1999-2009 and shows clearly that external competitiveness
-measured by this yardstick- deteriorated most in Ireland (by about 30%), Spain or Greece (by about
20%), and least in Germany (by less than 7%).
We treat real e⁄ective exchange rates as stationary in ￿rst-di⁄erences. Our estimation period is
indeed only a decade for each of the two IVARs and unit root tests do not reject the null of a unit
14For shocks to risk aversion, we follow the literature in summarizing the available information in multiple structural
models by reporting median and quantiles of impulse responses obtained through bootstrap replications. It should be
highlighted, however, that the median itself is not an impulse response function per se (and generally does not belong to
the space of impulse responses). In the same spirit, quantiles cannot be interpreted as con￿dence intervals in this case
and, for the same reason, measures of euclidian distance cannot be calculated.
15To ensure comparability between the two estimation periods, we only include in our sample those countries which
were members of the euro area from the outset in 1999 (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) and Greece, which joined relatively early on (namely in 2001).
We therefore discard those new EU Member States which joined later (after 2004), including Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta,
Cyprus and Estonia.
16Prior to EMU, a large part of the volatility in the relative evolution of REERs across European economies occurred
between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s.
12root in levels in our data.17 This is also in line with several well-established theoretical reasons for the
presence of non-stationarity in real e⁄ective exchange rates, such as Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ects.
Turning to other variables, foreign trade weights are constructed from the IMF DOTS database
on the basis of the average of bilateral imports and exports from 2004 to 2006. Financial weights are
constructed from the IMF CPIS database as the average of bilateral foreign assets and liabilities (both
for equities and debt securities) over 2000-2006.
5 Salient estimation and speci￿cation test results
The estimation results from our two IVAR models appear reasonable and a battery of speci￿cation
tests suggest that our models are well speci￿ed and characterise rather well the complex interactions
and dynamics of our high-dimensional real e⁄ective exchange rate systems. Due to the very large
amount of regressions involved, we only review in the following the main estimation and speci￿cation
tests results.
5.1 Stability of the models
The estimated models are stable. Figure 2 plots by descending order the absolute value of the largest
60 eigenvalues of the estimated IVAR systems￿corresponding companion matrix (out of over 186) and
shows that they all stand well below unity. The single largest eigenvalues equal 0.64 (pre-EMU) and
0.82 (post-EMU), which also suggests that shocks to real e⁄ective exchange rates in the two systems
tend to die out somewhat rapidly.
5.2 Signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients
Our prior that some channels of transmission of shocks in the two systems are more important than
others is largely con￿rmed (see Table 2). Most notably, the assumption that the US is a dominant
unit is vindicated: the US dollar has statistically signi￿cant spatio-temporal contamporaneous e⁄ects
on about two-third of the countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates before EMU, and on about four-￿fth
thereof after EMU. Other sources of strong cross-section dependence, such as an unobserved common
factor, also seem to play a role, most notably after 1999. Contemporenous cross-section averages are
indeed found to be statisically signi￿cant for over half of the countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates
post-EMU. Trade and ￿nancial linkages tend to have limited statistically signi￿cant spatio-temporal
e⁄ects (with the exception of foreign equity exposures pre-EMU, which then matter for less than one-
￿fth of the countries). Moreover, there is evidence for some persistence in real e⁄ective exchange rate
17These results are not reported due to space considerations. Even in longer time spans of data, it is common to
￿nd unit roots in real e⁄ective exchange rates (see e.g. Pesaran et al. (2004)), although for very long periods - such as
centuries - there is some evidence of mean reversion, see for instance Taylor et al. (2001). Such very long datasets are
available for a handful of currencies, however.
13dynamics, since exchange rate lags enter signi￿cantly in over half of the two IVAR models￿equations.
Last, the impact of neighbouring units other than the US is found to be signi￿cant for 20% of the
countries considered pre-EMU, against about 10% post-EMU.
These conclusions are broadly con￿rmed by standard F-tests for the joint signi￿cance of contem-
poraneous and lagged values of the explanatory variables. Figure 3 and Figure 5 report the test results
for each of these variables and for both estimation periods. The size of the test is reported on the
x-axis and rejection rates for the null hypothesis of no joint signi￿cance are reported on the y-axis. For
instance, results for the dominant unit indicate that the null hypothesis of no direct US dollar e⁄ect,
namely
H0 : a‘i = 0 for all ‘ 2 f0;1;::;pig,
is rejected for about half of the countries at the 1% level of con￿dence pre-EMU, against 70% of the
countries post-EMU. Overall, the test results con￿rm that the US, other unobserved common e⁄ects
and persistence in real e⁄ective exchange rate dynamics are signi￿cantly present for a large share of the
62 countries we consider, both pre- and post-EMU. Conversely, the in￿ uence of the remaining variables
(trade and ￿nancial linkages, other neighbouring units) is less -if at all- ascertained.
5.3 Tests for weak exogeneity of the US dollar
The assumption that the contemporaneous change in the US dollar is weakly exogenous in the equations
for the remaining currencies can be tested by using the procedure proposed by Wu (1973). Let b e1t
denote the residuals from the estimated model for the dominant unit. We run the following auxiliary
regressions for countries i = 2;3;:::;N,























wit + !ib e1t + eit,
which correspond to conditional country models in (5) augmented by the extra term !ib e1t. Wu￿ s
approach consists in testing the signi￿cance of b !i using a standard t-test. In practice, if the US
dollar was not weakly exogenous, ^ !i should be statistically signi￿cant. This testing procedure is
asymptotically equivalent to that of Hausman (1978), which is based on the statistical signi￿cance of
the di⁄erence between instrumental variable and least squares estimates.
A summary of the Wu-Hausman test results for weak exogeneity of the US dollar is reported in
Figure 8, which displays rejection rates (i.e. the number of countries for which the null was rejected
divided by the overall number of conditional models) for di⁄erent nominal size of the test. In both
estimation periods, i.e. pre- and post-EMU, rejection rates are very close to the nominal size of the
14test, which suggests that there is no evidence against weak exogeneity of the US dollar.
5.4 Economic meaningfulness (contemporaneous elasticities w.t. US dollar changes)
The sign and magnitude of the main estimation results are also in line with economic intuition. In
particular, when considering the estimated elasticity of the 61 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rate
with respect to contemporaneous US dollar changes post-EMU (see Figure 6), it is striking to observe
that the elasticity for countries such as Saudi Arabia and China, two well-known US dollar peggers,
is found to be positive and close to unity, while that for so-called "commodity currencies", which are
not pegged to the US dollar, and are often believed by market participants to move inversely with the
US dollar (see International Monetary Fund (2008)), is indeed found to be negative and close to -1.
5.5 Goodness of ￿t
In terms of goodness of ￿t, the adjusted R2 (hereby denoted R
2), of country-speci￿c models range from
close to 0 to 85% (see Figure 4 for the post-EMU IVAR). The R
2 for the US marginal model stands
at 13% (pre-EMU) and 18% (post-EMU). For a majority of the countries considered, R
2 is larger than
commonly found in the empirical literature on real e⁄ective exchange rates, due to the fact that -in
our set of conditional variables- the dominant unit and cross-section averages already capture a large
share of the data￿ s cross-section dependence.
5.6 Residual serial correlation
We formally test for residual serial correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey test with 4 lags, with the
null being no serial correlation and the alternative hypothesis being that errors follow an ARMA(p;q)
process, with max(p;q) = 4. There is strong evidence in support of no remaining serial correlation in
the residuals, since the null is rejected at the 1% level of con￿dence for only two countries in each period
(Israel and Romania in the pre-EMU IVAR system; Ecuador and Antigua-Barbuda in the post-EMU
IVAR system).
5.7 Structural breaks
Last, we test for the existence of possible structural breaks with a large array of tests, including
Ploberger and Kr￿mer (1992) maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) statistics (denoted PKsup); its
mean square variant (PKmsq); Nyblom (1989)￿ s tests for parameter constancy against non-stationary
alternatives (N); the Wald form of Quandt (1960)￿ s likelihood ratio statistics (QLR); the mean Wald
statistics of Hansen (MW); and Andrews and Ploberger (1994)￿ s Wald statistics based on exponential
averages (APW). The last three tests are Wald type tests for a single break at an unknown point in
time. We also run heterokedasticity-robust versions of these tests.
15Table 3 reports an overview of the tests￿results. There is little statistical evidence with which
to reject the hypothesis of coe¢ cient stability in the case of 73% to 92% (depending on the test) of
the equations comprising the IVAR model pre-EMU and in the case of 74% to 98% of the equations
post-EMU. This order of magnitude is very much in line with results found in the GVAR literature
(see e.g. DØes, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007)). The non-robust versions of the QLR, MW and
APW tests, however, show a relatively larger number of rejections. In view of the test outcomes for the
robust versions of these tests, the main reason for the rejection seems to be breaks in error variances
and not in the parameter coe¢ cients. Once possible changes in error variances are allowed for and
robust versions of these three tests considered indeed, the parameter coe¢ cients seem to be reasonably
stable. This conclusion is in line with many recent studies that ￿nd some evidence of changing volatility
as documented, among others, by Stock and Watson (2002), Artis et al. (2006) and Cecchetti et al.
(2005). Overall, not surprisingly there is some evidence of structural instability but this seems to be
mainly con￿ned to error variances.18 To address the possibility of breaks in error variances, we focus
on the bootstrap means of the impulse responses in the empirical analysis hereafter.
As a robustness check of these results, we also re-estimate pre- and post-EMU systems with country
speci￿c dummies set to capture one-o⁄exceptional events of unusually large exchange rate movements,
such devaluations, realignments in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, etc. A full list of these
dummies is reported in Table A.3. The results obtained are largely similar as those without dummies
and we therefore focus on the estimation results without dummies hereafter.
6 Spatio-temporal transmission of shocks before and after EMU
6.1 US dollar shocks
Figure 7 reports the contemporaneous impact of a one standard deviation shock to the US dollar on
the real e⁄ective exchange rate of the euro area countries, both pre- and post-EMU, along with 90%
con￿dence intervals computed with 2,000 boostrap replications.
In the decade preceding EMU, the impact of such a shock was signi￿cantly diverse across countries.
For instance, a typical one-standard deviation appreciation of the US dollar￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate
(i.e. about 1.25%) was associated with a 0.4% contemporaneous depreciation of the Deutsche Mark.
The currencies from some of the other future euro area members depreciated in tandem, including
that of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and the Netherlands, albeit to a smaller extent (i.e.
in the order of 0.1%-0.3%). By contrast, Italy and Greece￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rates tended to
appreciate, although to an extent that was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Those of Luxembourg
and Portugal were clearly una⁄ected. These results are partly reminiscent of a key stylized fact of the
18Over the two decades we consider, some of the countries in our sample have indeed experienced well-known devalu-
ations, exchange rate regime changes and other large country-speci￿c shock (such as Germany￿ s uni￿cation).
161980s related to US dollar shocks. Giavazzi et al. (1986) had found indeed that the Deutsche Mark
usually appreciated against other European currencies when the US dollar depreciated in that decade,
which would then dampen the e⁄ect of dollar shocks on the REER of France and Italy and amplify
that on Germany￿ s. Our results for Germany and Italy do con￿rm this (but not those for France,
admittedly).
The picture after EMU is completely di⁄erent. All of the euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange
rates now respond similarly to US dollar shocks, including those of Italy, Greece, Luxembourg and
Portugal which used to respond di⁄erently before the euro was introduced. According to the estimates,
further to a one-standard deviation appreciation of the US dollar￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate (i.e. again
about 1.25%), the real e⁄ective exchange rate of all euro area countries depreciate contemporaneously
within a range of 0.3%-0.6%. In other words, the pattern of adjustment of euro area countries￿external
competitiveness in the face of a US dollar shock has been more homogeneous since the creation of the
euro. What is striking, and perhaps more unexpected, is that this more homogeneous response is also
now similar to that of one country, namely Germany. Germany￿ s response has indeed hardly changed
with the creation of the euro, since the depreciation of its real e⁄ective exchange rate further to a
similar US dollar shock is estimated to have increased by barely 0.1 percentage points, to about 0.5%.
Not only is the impact of a US dollar shock more similar across euro area countries contempora-
neously, it is also more similar over time. Figure 9 reports the impulse response functions of the real
e⁄ective exchange rate of four selected euro area countries (Germany, Italy, Greece and Ireland) further
to a US dollar shock, both pre- and post-EMU, at horizons up to eight months. The ￿gures show how
synchronous the response has become across these countries after 1999. The initial depreciation of the
real e⁄ective exchange rate dies out almost completely after roughly two months in all cases, and at a
similar pace, which contrasts with the diverse responses that existed prior to EMU.
For the sake of comparison, Figures 10 and 11 report impulse response functions for selected major
￿ oaters (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland) and selected new EU Member
States (Poland, Hungary and Romania) as well as Iceland. Focusing ￿rst on the major ￿ oaters, the
US dollar￿ s reponse is clearly unchanged before and after EMU, which con￿rms that the shock remains
similar and allows indeed to make relevant comparisons between the two estimation periods. For the
other major currencies, there are clear di⁄erences in response patterns within each country and between
the two estimation periods and, even more importantly, after 1999 across countries. This suggests that
convergence towards Germany￿ s response patterns was con￿ned to euro area countries and unmatched
in the rest of the world. As regards the new EU Member States, the advent of the euro seems to have
also been a structural break as seen from the marked di⁄erences in respective responses￿patterns before
and after EMU. This perhaps re￿ ects also the e⁄ect of the substantial increase in trade and ￿nancial
integration between these countries and the euro area after the advent of the euro. Yet, post-EMU
impulse response functions remain appreciably di⁄erent from those of the euro area countries. This is
17even more so the case of Iceland, which has only started to embark on EU accession negotiations.
To assess more formally whether impulse response functions have changed statistically signi￿cantly,
Table 4 reports measures of euclidian distance as described in (8) and (10). Speci￿cally, the ￿us
i
statistics reported in the ￿rst column refer to the distance between the impulse response to a US dollar
shock on country i before and after EMU (distances signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% critical
value are highlighted in bold); the ￿us
DE;j statistics reported in the second column refer to the distance
between the impulse response to a US dollar shock on euro area member j after EMU and Germany
before EMU (distances which have become statistically signi￿cantly larger are highlighted in bold); and
the ￿us
ij statistics reported in the third column takes any of the euro area countries as a benchmark and
therefore refers to the distance between the impulse response to a US dollar shock on euro area member
j and benchmark euro area member i before EMU (the column reports the number of countries for
which the distance has not become statistically signi￿cantly smaller after EMU).
The null hypothesis that the impact of a US dollar shock is the same before and after EMU is rejected
for Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Greece, but not for the remaining euro area countries.
Interestingly, ￿us
i is smallest for Germany, suggesting that Germany￿ s external competitiveness pattern
of adjustment to US dollar shocks is the least a⁄ected by the creation of the euro. This is also true
for Austria and the Netherlands, which used to manage their legacy currencies very tightly vis-￿-vis
the Deutsche Mark prior to EMU. Conversely, ￿us
i is largest for Ireland, Italy and Greece (but not for
Spain), three countries of the alleged "periphery" of the area.
The null hypothesis that the impact of a US dollar shock is the same after EMU as it was for
Germany before EMU is rejected for none of the euro area countries. This con￿rms that the reponse
of the real e⁄ective exchange rate of all euro are countries to a US dollar shock is now quite similar
to that of Germany prior to EMU. In other words, the pattern of adjustment of euro area countries￿ s
external competitiveness in the face of such a global shock has converged after EMU to Germany￿ s
pattern before EMU. Put it again di⁄erently, their adjustment is not akin to the simple average of
countries￿patterns of adjustment before the euro, or to that of the country issuing the least credible
of the legacy currencies, or even to something completely new, but to the pattern of adjustment of the
economy that used to issue what is often regarded as one of the most credible of the legacy currencies.
Last, but not least, the ￿us
ij statistics suggests that the post-EMU responses of all euro area countries
have become systematically closer to Germany￿ s pre-EMU response. This again suggests that their
corresponding pattern of adjustment in external competitiveness has converged to that of Germany.
Conversely, there is evidence that 7 to 8 euro area countries￿post-EMU responses have become more
distant (i.e. diverged) from Portugal or Greece￿ s pre-EMU responses.
186.2 Generalised impulse response function shocks
We next turn to generalised shocks. As aforementioned, these cannot be interpreted as structural
economic shocks (unlike risk shocks or dominant unit shocks), although they remain useful to under-
stand the dynamics of global real e⁄ective exchange rates pre- and post- EMU. In constructing impulse
response functions, we take into account restrictions relating to the dominance of the US dollar on
the covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals. By contrast with standard Cholesky decomposi-
tions of the covariance matrix, which relies on a recursive causal chain, the ordering of the variables is
unimportant for GIRFs, which is a key advantage in our high dimensional case.
Figure 12 reports the contemporaneous impact (together with 90% bootstrapped bounds) of a one-
standard deviation generalised shock to the residuals of selected country-equation, i.e. Canada, Japan
and the United Kingdom. We decided to only present GIRF shocks to these countries￿residuals as
they are those issuing the most liquid currency in FX markets, after the US and the euro area. By and
large, the results are qualitatively similar as those obtained with the US dollar shock. Before EMU,
the contemporaneous response of euro area countries to a one-standard deviation generalised shock
to the residuals of Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate equations
was somewhat diverse across countries (i.e. within a range of -0.3% to 0.2% for the shock to the
Canadian dollar; -0.2% to 0% for the shock to the Japanese yen; -0.4% to 0.4% for the shock to the
Pound sterling). After EMU, similar shocks are associated with a more homogeneous contemporaneous
reponse across euro area countries, namely a depreciation in the order of -0.3% to -0.1% for the shock
to both the Japanese yen and the Pound sterling and an appreciation of some 0.2% to 0.5% for the
shock to the Canadian dollar.
To assess more formally whether impulse response functions have changed statistically signi￿cantly,
Table 5 reports measures of euclidian distance as described in (8) and (10), with broadly similar results
as those obtained with the US dollar shock. The null hypothesis that the impact of a generalised shock
to the three selected country-equations is the same before and after the EMU is again often rejected
for countries at the "periphery" of the euro area (including for one of the three generalised shocks for
Ireland and Portugal and for two of the three generalised shocks for Greece, Italy and Spain) with ￿l
i
being smallest (or among the smallest) for Germany, suggesting again that Germany￿ s real e⁄ective
exchange rate is the least a⁄ected by the creation of the euro, at least as far as the impact of such
generalised shocks is concerned. The null hypothesis that the impact of a generalised shock to the
three selected country-equations is the same after EMU as it was for Germany before EMU is rejected
for none of the euro area countries. This con￿rms again that the reponse of the real e⁄ective exchange
rate of all euro are countries to such shocks is now more similar to that of Germany prior to EMU
or, di⁄erently put, that their pattern of adjustment is now akin to that of the country issuing what is
often regarded as one of the most credible of the legacy currencies. Last, but not least, the ￿l
ij statistics
19con￿rms that the post-EMU responses of all euro area countries have become systematically closer to
Germany￿ s pre-EMU response.
6.3 Risk aversion shocks
To identify risk aversion shocks, we draw 2,000 candidate shocks that satisfy the required signs and
replicate this exercise with 200 boostrap replications to address the estimation uncertainty. We do
this for each of our decade-long estimation periods. Figure 13 reports the median and quantiles of the
successful draws.
There is evidence that euro area legacy currencies assumed a safe haven role before EMU, partic-
ularly those of the countries belonging to the alleged ￿core￿of the future area. In line with this, the
impact of a shock to risk aversion generally triggered an appreciation of these euro area legacy cur-
rencies. Such a shock to risk aversion19 was associated with a 0.5% contemporaneous appreciation of
the Deutsche Mark. Other currencies from future euro area members appreciated in tandem -including
that of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands- within a range
of about 0.2% to 0.5%. Currencies of some of the countries at the alleged ￿periphery￿of the future area
did not have such a safe haven role, however. In particular, Italy, Spain and Portugal￿ s real e⁄ective
exchange rates tended to depreciate (although the impact was insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for
Italy), and that of Greece was clearly una⁄ected.
The picture after EMU is, again, completely di⁄erent. Almost all euro area countries￿real e⁄ective
exchange rates now respond more similarly to a shock to risk aversion. According to the estimates,
further to a shock to risk aversion20 the real e⁄ective exchange rate of most euro area countries tend
to depreciate contemporaneously, within a range of -0.5% to -0.3%. Two exceptions are Finland and
Portugal￿ s exchange rates, which remain una⁄ected by the shock. In other words, the response of the
real e⁄ective exchange rate of most euro are countries to global shocks to risk aversion is now more
similar to that of Spain or Italy prior to EMU. Importantly, and similarly as for a global US dollar
shock, euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange rates depreciate when the US dollar appreciates
further to a post-EMU shock to global risk aversion. In our interpretation, this might re￿ ect the fact
that the euro has become the globally most relevant alternative to the US dollar as an international
currency, with a liquidity unmatched by any of the legacy currencies, and hence the main counterpart to
US dollar movements.21 Moreover, one of the most noteworthy changes is Germany￿ s response pattern,
from appreciation before EMU ￿ when the Deutsche Mark had a safe haven status￿to depreciation
after EMU￿along with all other euro area countries.
19Corresponding to an appreciation of the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc of 0.5%, 1.5% and 1.2%, respectively;
a depreciation of the Korean won and Polish zloty of -3.1% and -3.0%, respectively; and an increase in the VIX of 10%.
20Corresponding to an appreciation of the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc of 1.2%, 2.2% and 1.2%, respectively;
a depreciation of the Korean won and Polish zloty of -2.4% and -2.2%, respectively; and an increase in the VIX of 20%.
21This seemed notably the case in the 2007/9 crisis, in particular at times of heightened uncertainty and ￿ ight to the
safety and liquidity of US dollar assets (see e.g. McCauley and McGuire (2009)).
20Figures 14, 15 and 16 report the impulse response functions to a risk aversion shock for selected euro
area countries, other major ￿ oaters, New EU Member States and Iceland, respectively, as in Section
6.1. Not surprisingly, the US dollar, Japanese yen and Swiss franc appreciate further to a risk aversion
shock (with the impact of the shock vanishing completely after about two to four months), while the
Polish zloty depreciates (with the impact of the shock vanishing completely after about two to ￿ve
months), in line with the signs chosen for our identi￿cation scheme.
As a robustness check, we have also re-estimated the post-EMU system with a shorter sample period
that excludes the 2007/9 global ￿nancial crisis (with the sample ending in June 2007) to abstract from
possible e⁄ects arising from the period of exceptional market volatility that prevailed during these two
years. Interestingly, the results for the risk shock are qualitatively similar, albeit with larger quantiles
ranges, which suggests that our benchmark results were not driven by the global ￿nancial crisis.
As aforementioned, we do not have here a unique shock that statis￿es the restricted signs but many.
Hence, many di⁄erent impulse response candidates (not only one) could be used to calculate euclidian
distance measures. We have followed the literature by reporting median and quantiles of the impulse
responses obtained through bootstrap replications. It should be highlighted, however, that the median
itself is not an impulse response function per se (and generally does not belong to the space of impulse
responses). For this reason measures of euclidian distance are not calculated for this particular type of
shock.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess whether the creation of the euro changed the way global turbulences
a⁄ect euro area and other economies, focusing on the adjustment of competitiveness in the face of global
economic shocks. To this aim, it has drawn from a newly developed econometric technique, applying
in￿nite VAR theory featuring a dominant unit to a large set of over 60 countries￿real e⁄ective exchange
rates. We have estimated two high dimensional VARs -one before and one after EMU- and compared
them by investigating the spatio-temporal transmission of three types of shocks: (global) US dollar
shocks, (non-identi￿ed) generalised shocks and (global) risk aversion shocks. The estimated systems
successfully pass a range of speci￿cation tests with regard to stability, economic meaningfulness of the
coe¢ cients, weak exogeneity of the dominant unit, residual serial correlation and structural breaks.
They are also robust to controlling for one-o⁄ exceptional events of unusually large exchange rate
movements, such as devaluations or realignments in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, as well
as to a shorter estimation period, and notably to the exclusion of the 2007/9 global ￿nancial crisis
which allows to abstract from possible e⁄ects arising from the period of exceptional market volatility
that prevailed at the time.
The creation of the euro has signi￿cantly changed the way global turbulence a⁄ect euro area and
21other economies. We ￿nd that the pattern of responses depends crucially on the nature of global
shocks. One of the paper￿ s key result is that the response of euro area countries has become more
similar to that of Germany, i.e. the economy that issued the anchor legacy currency in Europe prior
to EMU, when it come to US dollar shocks or di⁄erent generalised shocks considered in the paper.
By contrast, when considering shocks to global risk aversion, the response of euro area countries￿real
e⁄ective exchange rates has become more distant from that of Germany prior to EMU and closer to
that of countries such as Italy, Portugal or Spain prior to EMU.
Importantly, in the case of both types of global shocks, euro area countries￿real e⁄ective exchange
rates depreciate when the US dollar appreciates after EMU. In our interpretation, this might re￿ ect the
fact that the euro has become the globally most relevant alternative to the US dollar as an international
currency, with a liquidity unmatched by any of the legacy currencies, and hence the main counterpart
to US dollar movements. One of the most noteworthy changes is Germany￿ s response pattern to global
risk aversion shocks, from appreciation before EMU ￿ when the Deutsche Mark had a safe haven status￿
to depreciation after EMU￿along with all other euro area countries.
An implication of the results could be that euro area economies might not necessarily be subject to
marked appreciation pressures in periods of heightened global risk aversion, an undeniable bene￿t for
Germany according to some observers.22 Our results give empirical support to this claim, at least for
the ￿rst ten years of EMU. But if an adverse US dollar shock were to occur down the line, rather than
a shock to global risk aversion, such as a massive loss of con￿dence in the US currency (due to e.g.
the US￿ s high ￿scal and external imbalances), the real e⁄ective exchange rates of euro area countries
would then be subject to marked appreciation pressures, as suggested by our results.
Looking ahead, the ￿ndings presented in the paper also suggest that the dissimilarities in external
competitiveness among euro area countries over the last decade, which are at the core of today￿ s debate
on the future of the euro area, is unlikely to have been caused by the impact of global shocks considered
here. Future research could therefore look into country-speci￿c domestic shocks as the main source
of divergence in external competitiveness across the euro area. This calls, for instance, for further
examination of the response of real e⁄ective exchange rates in the ￿rst decade of EMU to shocks
relating to domestic wage setting and bargaining, domestic price ￿ exibility and domestic non-price
competitiveness. Identifying the geographical origin of non-dominant shocks in large VAR systems is
for this reason a topic that would deserve particular attention in future research.
22Such a view is most candidly expressed by a column of M. Wolf, the Financial Times￿Chief Economics commentator,
written in late-2010 (Wolf (2010)): "The euro has also shielded the German economy from what would have been still
bigger shocks: imagine what would have happened, in the absence of the euro. The exchange rate of the D-Mark would
have exploded upwards, as currency crises savaged the European economy, as happened in the 1990s. In peripheral
Europe, currency depreciations would have been at least as big as, if not bigger than, sterling￿ s. The absence of such
shocks has greatly enhanced the prospects for the German recovery. The creation of the eurozone was, for this reason
alone, much more than a favour Germany did for its partners. It was also a big economic (not to mention political) gain
for Germany. German industrialists are clear on this, as is the government".
22Table 1: Standard deviation and total cumulated change of the euro area countries￿real
e⁄ective exchange rate changes (pre- and post-EMU)
Standard deviation Cumulated change
1988 - 1999 1999 - 2009 1988 - 1999 1999 - 2009
Austria 0.80% 0.69% 4.8% 6.4%
Belgium 0.89% 0.74% -0.3% 12.3%
Finland 1.68% 1.57% -17.6% 7.6%
France 0.81% 0.77% -5.1% 8.1%
Germany 1.71% 0.93% -18.4% 6.4%
Germany (excl. 01/91) 0.99% - - -
Ireland 1.67% 1.74% -9.5% 30.4%
Italy 1.67% 0.82% -9.5% 13.5%
Luxembourg 0.89% 0.49% 5.5% 11.3%
Netherlands 0.86% 0.83% -2.8% 14.0%
Portugal 0.89% 0.72% 27.2% 13.3%
Spain 1.17% 0.57% -3.9% 19.9%
Greece 1.09% 0.73% 23.4% 19.9%

















1 10 19 28 37 46 55
Post-EMU
Figure 2: Absolute value of the largest 60 eigenvalues of the estimated IVAR system￿ s respective
companion matrix (ranked in descending order)
Table 2: Overview of the statistical signi￿cance of the variables (5% level)
Pre-EMU IVAR system Post-EMU IVAR system
No. of Share in total No. of Share in total
signi￿cant coef. no. of coef. signi￿cant coef. no. of coef.
Variables capturing possible strong cross-section dependence
US dollar 37 62% 48 80%
(lagged) US dollar 19 28% 11 18%
C.S. average 13 22% 33 55%
(lagged) C.S. average 7 11% 9 15%
Variables capturing possible weak cross-section dependence
Lagged spatial e⁄ects:
trade 7 11% 5 8%
(equity) ￿nancial 7 16% 3 7%
(debt) ￿nancial 4 9% 4 9%
Own lags 40 55% 41 58%
Other neighbours 14 20% 9 13%
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Figure 3: Pre-EMU F-test results - Rejection rate of the joint null hypothesis of statistical insigni￿cance
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Own effects
Figure 5: Post-EMU F-test results - Rejection rate of the joint null hypothesis of statistical insigni￿-













New Zealand, Canada & Australia
Figure 6: Elasticity of the 61 dependant real e⁄ective exchange rates with respect to contemporaneous
US dollar changes (post-EMU)
26Table 3: Overview of structural break tests
Pre-EMU Post-EMU
Number percentage Number percentage
Tests (out of 62) (out of 62)
PKsup 5 8% 3 5%
PKmsq 5 8% 4 6%
R 7 11% 16 26%
r-R 9 15% 9 15%
QLR 17 27% 12 19%
r-QLR 6 10% 1 2%
MW 16 26% 12 19%
r-MW 5 8% 6 10%
APW 17 27% 11 18%
r-APW 6 10% 1 2%
Notes: The table shows the number (percentage) of rejections of the null of no structural break in each of the 62 country-speci￿c
equations for the two IVAR models at the 5% level of con￿dence. Various structural break tests are considered here: PKsup and
PKmsq, refer to tests based on the cumulative sums of OLS residuals; R is the Nyblom test for time-varying parameters; QLR,
MW and APW are the sequential Wald statistics for a single break at an unknown point in time. The pre￿x ￿r￿ denotes
heteroskedasticity-robust versions of the latter tests. Critical values are computed under the null of no structural break and are
calculated by bootstrap replications.




DE;j rejections for ￿US
ij
Austria 0.17 (0.24) 0.19 (0.59) 4
Belgium 0.23 (0.28) 0.14 (0.52) 3
Finland 0.58 (0.46) 0.44 (0.60) 2
France 0.29 (0.25) 0.14 (0.51) 3
Germany 0.15 (0.48) 0.15 (0.48) 0
Ireland 0.69 (0.31) 0.53 (0.56) 3
Italy 0.69 (0.50) 0.14 (0.94) 4
Luxembourg 0.38 (0.41) 0.16 (0.82) 4
Netherlands 0.20 (0.27) 0.13 (0.52) 3
Portugal 0.28 (0.24) 0.25 (0.68) 7
Spain 0.18 (0.33) 0.18 (0.41) 1
Greece 0.44 (0.31) 0.10 (0.77) 8
Notes: ￿US
i is the euclidean distance between the impulse responses to a US dollar shock for euro area country i before and after
EMU; see (8). The 90% critical values reported in parentheses for hypothesis (9) that the distance is zero are computed by bootstrap
replications under the null of no structural break; ￿US
DE;j is the euclidian distance between the impulse responses to a US dollar shock
for euro area country j after EMU and that for Germany before EMU; see (10). The 90% critical values reported in parentheses
are calculated by bootstrap replications for the null hypothesis (11) that the distance is not larger; ￿US
ij is the euclidian distance
between the impulse responses to a US dollar shock for euro area country j after EMU and euro area member i before EMU; the































































































































































































Figure 7: Contemporaneous impact of a one-standard deviation generalised shock to the dominant unit
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Figure 9: Impulse response function to a one-standard deviation generalised shock to the dominant
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Figure 10: Impulse response function to a one-standard deviation generalised shock to the dominant
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Figure 11: Impulse response function to a one-standard deviation generalised shock to the dominant





































































































































































































































































































Figure 12: Contemporaneous impact of a one-standard deviation generalised shock to the major ￿ oating






























































































































































































Figure 13: Contemporaneous impact of a shock to risk aversion (median and 90% quantile range) on
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Figure 14: Impulse response function to a shock to risk aversion (median and up to 90% quantile
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Figure 15: Impulse response function to a shock to risk aversion (median and up to 90% quantile
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Figure 16: Impulse response function to a shock to risk aversion (median and up to 90% quantile
ranges) on selected new EU Member States and Iceland￿ s real e⁄ective exchange rate
36Table 5: Measures of euclidian distance between impulse response functions: Results for
generalised shocks to Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom











Austria 0.15 (0.25) 0.24 (0.21) 0.23 (0.30) 0.25 (0.74) 0.16 (0.60) 0.38 (0.99) 0 5 3
Belgium 0.22 (0.25) 0.27 (0.24) 0.26 (0.31) 0.20 (0.77) 0.09 (0.58) 0.27 (0.91) 1 3 1
Finland 0.57 (0.52) 0.14 (0.42) 0.94 (0.57) 0.56 (1.03) 0.28 (0.57) 0.64 (1.36) 2 0 4
France 0.20 (0.21) 0.26 (0.21) 0.23 (0.29) 0.18 (0.74) 0.09 (0.53) 0.26 (0.85) 0 2 0
Germany 0.15 (0.61) 0.12 (0.51) 0.23 (0.72) 0.15 (0.61) 0.12 (0.51) 0.23 (0.72) 0 0 0
Ireland 0.12 (0.27) 0.19 (0.34) 0.70 (0.48) 0.22 (0.61) 0.24 (0.47) 0.47 (1.09) 0 0 1
Italy 0.56 (0.41) 0.15 (0.41) 0.74 (0.54) 0.14 (1.04) 0.09 (0.54) 0.25 (1.38) 2 0 4
Luxembourg 0.29 (0.28) 0.32 (0.26) 0.40 (0.33) 0.26 (0.89) 0.15 (0.70) 0.39 (1.13) 5 6 8
Netherlands 0.17 (0.23) 0.39 (0.21) 0.34 (0.28) 0.18 (0.69) 0.15 (0.57) 0.22 (0.95) 0 4 3
Portugal 0.11 (0.19) 0.20 (0.18) 0.22 (0.23) 0.39 (0.75) 0.38 (0.45) 0.55 (0.91) 0 1 1
Spain 0.30 (0.27) 0.04 (0.27) 0.52 (0.33) 0.25 (0.89) 0.13 (0.44) 0.36 (1.23) 2 0 6
Greece 0.09 (0.23) 0.34 (0.22) 0.28 (0.26) 0.21 (0.65) 0.12 (0.65) 0.28 (0.94) 0 6 2
Notes: CA, JA, and UK, stands for Canada, Japan and United Kingdom, respectively. ￿‘
i, for ‘ 2 fCA;JA;UKg is the euclidean
distance between the impulse responses to a generalized shock to country-equation ‘ and for euro area country i before and after
EMU; see (8). The 90% critical values reported in parentheses for hypothesis (9) that the distance is zero are computed by bootstrap
replications under the null of no structural break; ￿‘
DE;j is the euclidian distance between the impulse responses to a generalized
shock to country-equation ‘ and for euro area country j after EMU and that for Germany before EMU; see (10). The 90% critical
values reported in parentheses are calculated by bootstrap replications for the null hypothesis (11) that the distance is not larger;
￿‘
ijis the euclidian distance between the impulse responses to a generalized shock to country-equation ‘ and for euro area country j
after EMU and euro area member i before EMU; the column reports the number of countries for which the null that the distance is
smaller is rejected.
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Russian & LTCM crises
(August 1998)
Figure A.1: Selected historical episodes of heightened risk aversion and increases in the VIX index
Table A.1: Change in real e⁄ective exchange rates and level of the VIX during selected
historical episodes of heightened risk aversion
Lehman brs. 9/11 Russian and Iraq invasion
failure attacks LTCM crises of Kuwait
Sep - Oct 2008 Sep-01 Aug - Sep 1998 Aug 1990￿
United States 9.2% 0.4% 0.2% -1.8%
Canada -8.6% -1.9% -2.7% -0.4%
Japan 15.4% 1.6% 3.3% -0.7%
Australia -21.7% -3.8% -7.2% -0.4%
New Zealand -4.8% -2.2% -3.8% 1.0%
United Kingdom -1.3% 0.9% -0.9% 2.3%
Switzerland 3.4% 1.6% 3.7% 3.3%
Germany -4.5% 0.3% 2.0% 0.7%
France -4.2% 0.2% 1.4% 0.9%
Korea -20.9% -1.6% -7.8% -1.1%
Iceland -21.1% -1.8% -1.3% -0.3%
Poland -7.8% -0.1% -7.0% -2.2%
VIX 98.7 38.6 70.7 27.8
Notes: As a motivation for the sign restrictions chosen for the identi￿cation of risk aversion shocks, the table reports changes in real
e⁄ective exchange rates during selected historical episodes of heightened risk aversion for the currencies sign-restricted under the
identi￿cation scheme - and for the sake of comparison - the level of the VIX index during those episodes
40Table A.2: IMF IFS database: overview of missing data and comparison with BIS data-
base
Gaps (in ￿rst di⁄erenced series) Correlation
Missing period No.of obs. with BIS data
Australia 9 gaps between June 03 - June 08 50 99.2%
Canada 7 gaps between October 03 - October 2008 17 97.6%
Germany October 03 - November 03 2 94.8%
Greece 2 gaps between September 03 - May 04 5 57.1%
Ireland 2 gaps between July 03 - March 06 32 98.1%
Italy 3 gaps between October 03 - June 06 6 97.7%
Japan 4 gaps between March 04 - October 08 9 98.9%
Netherlands October 03 - November 03 2 92.6%
Poland 3 gaps between September 04 - October 05 9 93.0%
Portugal 3 gaps between October 03 - December 06 7 52.4%
Saudi Arabia 4 gaps between August 03 - October 08 21 97.8%
Notes: We include all (45) countries in the IMF IFS database for which real e⁄ective exchange rate data for the period January
1988 - August 2009 are available, including: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, The Bahamas, Kingdom of Bahrain, Belgium,
Belize, Bolivia, Chile, P.R. China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Israel, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Philippines, Romania, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
United Kingdom, United States and Zambia. A number of euro area or other systemically important countries are missing from
this list because the IMF IFS database has no or missing data in their case. We interpolate missing observations using BIS indices
(see Table A.2 for details). In addition, we have included Argentina, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Thailand from this latter
database since they are important emerging markets. We have taken to that end broad BIS 58-country indices from January 1994
onwards. Data prior 1994 were constructed using data on nominal exchange rates, consumer price indices (both taken from the IMF
IFS database) and trade weights taken as constructed from the IMF DOTS database. Historical correlations are computed with the
￿rst log di⁄erences of the real e⁄ective exchange rate indices between February 1994 (starting date for BIS series) to the ￿rst gap in
the corresponding series in the IMF IFS database.
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